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Abstract

This paper examines what role the UN played in the ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots after the Turkish Cypriots declared independence in 1983. The UN has been actively
involved with ethnic conflict in the past 50 years and will continue to do so into the future.
Examining the UN's policy towards the Turkish Cypriot secession will contribute to the
understanding of the role the UN will play in future ethnic conflicts. How did the UN respond to
the Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence and what impact did that response have on
negotiations involving Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the UN in the future? I examined
UN documents and the writings of the Turkish Cypriot leader during this time, Rauf Denktash, to
answer this question. The UN's immediate response was a series of resolutions that condemned
the declaration and denied recognition to the newly declared state. This response was effective in
mitigating the impact of the Turkish Cypriot declaration on future negotiations and the status
quo.

1

Introduction
Ethnic conflict has created a number of international issues in the past 100 years. Policy
makers struggle to find solutions to problems all over the globe that stem from divisions of
ethnicity. Scholars dedicate themselves to understanding the reasons for the outbreak of violence
and civil war in some situations and not others. Studies include empirical and theoretical
conclusions but it is certain that ethnic conflict will continue to be an issue in the future. Ethnic
conflicts have provided The United Nations (UN) with a needed In ethnic conflicts throughout
the world by acting as a mediator, peacekeeper and humanitarian aid giver. It is safe to say that
the UN is an important actor in issues stemming from ethnic divisions.l

This paper examines what role the UN played in the ethnic conflict between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots after the Turkish Cypriots declared independence. How did the UN respond to
the Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence and what impact did that response have on
negotiations involving Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the UN in the future? The so called
"Cyprus problem" has remained unsolved for nearly forty years despite the UN's heavy
involvement in promoting the reunification of the island. The Turkish Cypriot Declaration of
Independence was an extremely controversial move that is viewed very differently by the parties
involved in the Cyprus dispute. The declaration established a Turkish Cypriot state that was
separate from the Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus. Understanding the UN's response and
the long-term impact of the Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence will aid in the study of
the four decades of UN-Cypriot relations. Furthermore, the study will aid in understanding the
role ofthe UN in ethnic conflicts by looking at an example of ethnically driven secessionism.
I Randall 1. Blimes, "The Indirect Effect of Ethnic Heterogenity on the Likelihood of
Civil War Onset," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (Aug. 2006): 536-547 and Yahya
Sadowski, "Ethnic Conflict," Foreign Policy, no. 111 (Summer 1998): 12-23.
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The UN's immediate response was a series of resolutions that condemned the declaration and
denied recognition to the newly declared state. This response was effective in mitigating the
impact of the Turkish Cypriot declaration on future negotiations and the status quo.

There are a large number of secondary sources concerning Cyprus. In such a highly
politicized topic, many of these sources contain a clear national bias towards either the Greek or
Turkish Cypriots. Generally, these sources argue the rightfulness and legitimacy of their own
people over the other side. A clear example of this can be seen in Metin Tarnkoc's The Turkish
Cypriot State: The Embodiment of the Right to Self-determination in which he wrote that the
Turkish Cypriot territory meets all the prerequisites for a state and therefore should be
recognized internationally. Instead, Tarnkoc seems to dismiss the important decisions by the
international community as a fluke based on a lack of knowledge. On the other end of the
spectrum is Van Coufoudakis' Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective,
which pushes for increased international pressure against the TRNC, which he sees as being
extremely detrimental to finding a solution. The author described RaufR. Denktash, a prominent
Turkish Cypriot figure and president ofthe TRNC for 30 years, as being manipulative and
willing to use extremist organizations to intimidate his own people. These works have a clear
argument but are questionable because of their heavy biases. Still, they provide conflicting views
on the international reaction to the Turkish Cypriots' attempts at independence and therefore are
examples of literature written by those involved in the ethnic conflict?

2 Van Coufoudakis, Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective,
(Minneapolis: Modem Greek Studies, 2006); Necati Munir Ertekun, ed., The Status of the Two
Peoples in Cyprus: Legal Opinions, (Letkosa: TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005);
Lawrence Hargrove and others, "Cyprus: International Law and the Prospects for a Settlement,"
Proceedings of the AnnualMeeting (American Society of International Law) 78, (Apr 1984):
107-132; Salahi Sonyel, Why did the Intercommunal Talks on Cyprus (1968-71) Fail? (Letkosa:
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A number of scholars also approach the issue of Turkish Cypriot independence from the
stand-point that the island was used as a bargaining chip in much larger international politics.
They look at the politics of other countries like Turkey, Greece, the U.K. and the U.S. to
determine what sort of stake they have in the Cyprus problem and thus why they acted certain
ways when addressing issues like the Turkish Cypriot declaration. Cold War politics often
played a role in these works like, in Mallinson's Cyprus: A Modern History. He wrote that the
maneuverings of the major actors In their relationship to Cyprus were part of a larger game
involving U.S.-Soviet relations and NATO. Other historians look at the countries outside of
Cyprus as self-interested actors trying to exert as much control as possible on a smaller island for
more regional reasons outside ofthe Cold War. The article by Crawshaw takes this into
consideration as she discusses Turkey's interest in becoming closer with the European Council
and therefore was looking for a way out of being responsible for the Cyprus issue. Understanding
the motivations of other states is essential in a discussion of the international response to the
TRNC's Declaration ofIndependence.

3

There are a number of scholars who write about the issue of Turkish Cypriot
independence as a step in the larger issue of UN facilitated negotiations between the two
communities. Clement Dodd has written a number of influential books about the long history of
CYREP, 2000); Metin Tamkoc, The Turkish Cypriot State: The Embodiment of the Right to Selfdetermination, (London: K. Rustem & Brother, 1988).
Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: A Failure in Western Diplomacy," The World Today 40,
no. 2 (Feb 1984): 73-78; Christopher Hitchens, "Uncorking the Genie: The Cyprus Question and
Turkey's Military Rule," MERIP Reports, 122 (Mar-Apr 1984): 25-27; Ersin KalayclOglu,
Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005);
William Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History, (London: LB. Tauris, 2005); "One More Twist,"
Economic and Political Weekly 18, no. 49 (Dec 1983): 2039; David Souter, "An Island Apart: A
Review ofthe Cyprus Problem," Third World Quarterly 6, no. 3 (Jul 1984): 657 - 674.
3
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the intercommunal talks on Cyprus. The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict and
Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After are critical in understanding the impact ofthe
Declaration on Cyprus negotiations. Leigh Bruce writes in his article "Cyprus: A Last Chance"
that the declaration ultimately forced the resulting talks to fail, despite how close they may have
come to succeeding in reunifying. This argument was prevalent in the first few years following
the declaration as scholars assumed that the push for independence was a push away from
reunification. A number of scholars disagree on the significance of the declaration, while others
write little about the topic at all. This understanding ofthe TRNC's declaration in terms ofthe
ongoing and international negotiations will help explain why the UN reacted how it did and how
that affected subsequent negotiations between the two ethnic communities.4

There are a number of collections of primary documents that are useful in the study of
UN-Cypriot relations. The most important source is the UN Security Council and General
Assembly's Official Records. These records include transcripts of UN Security Council
meetings, letters from representatives, resolutions and periodic reports on the status of the
Cyprus problem by the UN Secretary General. Also important are the writings of Rauf Denktash,
who, as mentioned earlier, was the elected leader of the Turkish Cypriots for over thirty years
and was a policy maker during the time period under review. His writings are numerous and he
was very helpful in an e-mail exchange with the author. Finally, newspaper articles from The
New York Times provide additional details surrounding the declaration as observed by the press.
Suha Bolukbasi, "The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement
between 1954 and 1996," International Journal of Middle East Studies 30, no. 3 (Aug, 1998):
411 - 434; Clement Dodd, The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict (Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010); Clement Dodd, Disaccord on Cyprus: The UN Plan and After (Eothen, 2004);
David Hannay, Cyprus: The Searchfor a Solution (New York: LB. Tauris, 2005); Leigh Bruce,
"Cyprus: A Last Chance," Foreign Policy, no. 58 (1985): 115 - 133; Zaim Necatigil, The Cyprus
Question and the Turkish Position in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
4

5

Background: Cyprus, the UN and Division 1925-1982

Greeks first populated the island of Cyprus in 2000 BC. Greek was the principle language
of the island and the Greek Orthodox Church was the dominant religion after the island became
part of the Eastern Roman Empire some centuries. For most of its history, Cyprus was under the
control of other empires and states including the Phoenicians, Byzantines and Venetians. The
Ottomans took control of the island in 1571 and for the next 300 years, Turks colonized the
island and became an established and large minority.'
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Mallinson, Cyprus, 9 and Dodd, History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict, 1-2.

6

In 1878, the island was leased to the British by the Ottomans. Britain annexed Cyprus in
1914 and the island became a colony of Britain in 1925 as a result of World War 1. Turkey
officially relinquished its rights to the island with the Treaty of Luasanne. Like many colonized
areas in the early twentieth century, the Greek Cypriot population latched onto the ideals set
forth in the UN Charter regarding the right to self-determination of peoples.

6

Self-determination for Greek Cypriots meant something different than it did for many
budding nations. Greek Cypriots had felt a great sense of nationalism and connection to their
Greek heritage since the 19th century and the idea of enosis, or reunification with mainland
Greek, was popular among Greek Cypriots. By the time World War II ended, the concept of
enosis had spread among the Greek Cypriots and as part of the anti-colonial movements ofthe
post-war period, increasing pressure was put on the British to relinquish control of the island.
From this struggle, the Nationalist Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), a Greek Cypriot
paramilitary group that resorted to violence to promote enos is, emerged and waged a protracted
campaign against the British.7
Turkish Cypriot nationalism was a reactionary force to the idea of enosis. Turkish
Cypriots were the minority on the island and did not want their fates to be decided by Greek
Cypriots. They supported the division of the island so that the Turkish Cypriots could be
absorbed by Turkey. They recognized the dangers of a majority as strong as that held by the
Greek Cypriots. Some scholars claim that the British were responsible for the rise of Turkish
Cypriot nationalism because they attempted to pit the two communities against each other so that
Dodd, Disaccord, 1; Mallinson, 1-20; Necatigil, The Cyprus Question, 4-5; Souter, An
Island Apart, 657-658.
6

7

Dodd, History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict, 3-7; Mallinson, 21-31.

7

the British could maintain control over the island. Either way, the Turkish Cypriots were just as
adamant about their right to self-determination as the Greek Cypriots were. They formed their
own paramilitary organization that they called Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT). Rauf
Denktash emerged during this time as a leader in Turkish Cypriot political organizations and
continued holding leadership roles for the next 50 years as a part of negotiation processes and
president of the Turkish Cypriot state. 8

The UN took on great importance as the Cyprus issue continued to develop in the early
years of the international organization's existence. The Greek Cypriots took their case to the UN
with the intent to utilize international pressure to compel Britain to relinquish its colonial ties to
the island. With the support of Greece, Cypriots under the leadership of Archbishop Mikarios,
lobbied to be heard before the United Nations officially in 1954 with an appeal that pointed to
various articles of the UN Charter that they argued applied to Cyprus. 9

By the end of the 1950's, international pressure, as well as rising violence in Cyprus
forced the British to grant the island independence. The Zurich and London Conferences, held by
Turkey, Greece and the British, resulted in three treaties and the foundation of a new constitution
for the new state that would not allow either enosis (the goal of Greek Cypriots) or partition (the
goal of Turkish Cypriots). The three treaties were the Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance and
Establishment. These treaties are still referred to in legal discourse about the island even today,

8

Coufoudakis, 4-5; Dodd, History and Politics, 7-11; Mallinson, 109; Souter, 660.

9 Mallinson, 21-30; Hubert Faustmann, "The Historical Background to the UN's
Involvement with Cyprus," in Work of the UN Richmond and Ker-Lindsay ed., 3-35, here 4.

8

as the Treaty of Guarantee prohibited the alteration of the articles of the constitution and required
that Turkey, Greece and Great Britain maintain the status quo on the island.

10

The British relinquished their control of the island in 1960 as a new constitution was
implemented that required collaboration between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Britain
retained two sovereign airbases on the island. The new republic would have a Greek Cypriot
president and Turkish Cypriot vice president which would be elected by their respective
communities. Power would be shared and the Turkish Cypriots were granted significant power
for a minority group. Both communities held a veto power in most of the state's affairs which
meant that cooperation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots was essential for the
government to function.

II

By 1963, the three agreements were breaking down. The President of the Republic of
Cyprus, Archbishop Mikarios, presented the legislature in Cyprus with changes to the
constitution that would increase the power ofthe Greek Cypriot majority. Fighting broke out
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots fled their government positions.
Mikarios and the Greek Cypriots were left to run the government without their Turkish Cypriot
partners. The UN arrived in Cyprus shortly after Turkish Cypriots left the government and
violence broke out between the two ethnic groups. On March 4, 1964, the UN Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 186 which spoke out against the fighting between the two
groups and called for the creation of a UN peacekeeping force. The Security Council was a part
of the UN in charge of maintaining international stability and had five permanent members
(United States, France, Great Britain, Soviet Union and China) along with 10 nonpermanent

10

Dodd, History and Politics, 38; Necatigil, 13-17, here 14.

II

Dodd, History and Politics, 42-44; Hannay, Cyprus, 3-4; Souter, 661-662.

9

rotating members from the General Assembly. The peacekeeping force in Cyprus was renewed
every six months for nearly forty years after. Resolution 186 would become infamous for the
Turkish Cypriots because it referred to the "Republic of Cyprus" and the "Government of Cyprus
when discussing permissions for entering the island. While seemingly insignificant, by
acknowledging the authority of the Government of Cyprus without the presence of the Turkish
Cypriots, the UN recognized the now solely Greek Cypriot government as being valid. In
addition to its peacekeeping forces, the UN attempted direct mediation and peacemaking efforts
as early as 1964. When these direct talks failed, the Secretary General started intercommunal
talks in 1967 with the UN taking a less active role in peacemaking that would continue to be the
UN's policy until today.

12

In a recent discussion with the author, Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, expressed
his dissatisfaction with that decision. He stated:

The UN; [sic] with the aid and support of US and Gt. Britain, (indeed the whole Security
Council) refused to diagnose the problem for what it was (namely a criminal,
unconstitutional armed attempt to convert a partnership state into a Greek State, which
meant colonizing Turkish Cypriots by destroying their vested Constitutional rights.

This became the beginning of a now long-standing difference of opinion between the Turkish
Cypriots and the UN regarding the validity of the Greek Cypriot government. The Turkish
Cypriots maintained that because the Republic of Cyprus was operating without the presence of

12RaufDenktash,

The Cyprus Triangle (London: George Allen, 1982),34-35; Dodd,
History and Politics, 63; Necatigil, 21-26, 49-51; Oliver Richmond, "UN Mediation in Cyprus,"
in Work of the UN in Cyprus, ed. Richmond and Ker- Lindsay, 101-123; Sonyel, Why Did the
Intercommunal Talks on Cyprus Fail, 2.

10

Turkish Cypriots like what was outlined in the 1960 constitution, the government was not in
accordance with the various treaties that established the independent state. 13
....•.
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Figure 2- A Political Map Cyprus After 1974.
Source: CIA World Factbook, Cyprus
The island became physically divided in 1974 when Turkish troops occupied the
Northern third of Cyprus after violence broke out yet again between the two communities. This
controversial move created the border that exists today between the North and South. The UN
condemned the unilateral Turkish military action, but to this day Turkish troops remain on the
island. This meant that in addition to the issue of political representation that originally divided
the two ethnic groups, property and territory became central to the Cyprus problem. The UN
continued its work and manned the buffer zone between the area controlled by the occupying
Turkish forces and the Republic of Cyprus. In 1975, the UN Security Council called on the

13

RaufDenktash

e-mail message to author, March 10,2011.
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Secretary General to maintain a Good Offices Mission tasked with bringing the two communities
to the table to negotiate a settlement. These intercommunal negotiations were the cornerstone of
the UN's work and are, simply put, direct talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
leaders in order to create a workable solution.

14

Turkey established the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975. They were careful not
to allow the Turkish Cypriots to declare statehood at this juncture when their move to occupy the
island had already drawn a lot of criticism from the international community. The Turkish
Federated State of Cyprus was essentially controlled by the Turkish and was treated as a
domestic territory of that country. Still, a Turkish Cypriot administration handled the day to day
affairs of their people, as they had done since 1963.15

Lead up to the Declaration
It is important to understand the reasons for the Turkish Cypriot Declaration of
Independence as well as the state of the relationship between the UN and Cyprus leading up to
the declaration. The reasoning for the Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence provides
insight into the state of the ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and how the UN
handled that state of affairs. The UN maintained its Good Offices Mission into the early 1980' s
and regularly worked to convene the two communities of Cyprus in a search for a solution that
would reunify the island and its people. It still recognized the Republic of Cyprus, or the Greek

Coufoudakis, 7; Dodd, History and Politics, 114-115; Dan Lindley, "Assessing the
Role ofthe UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," in Work of the UN, 77-94; UNSC, Resolution
367.
14

15

Coufoudakis, 7; Necatigil, 128.

12
Cypriot side, as being the legitimate, de jure government over the entire island. The UN
facilitated talks were considered to be between the two communities rather than between states.
So while the Republic of Cyprus was considered a legitimate state by the UN, the issue of
statehood was left out of the intercommunal talks. The issue was seen as being between two
communities, not a state and its disenfranchised minority. Despite the Secretary General's
efforts, changes occurred during this time within Greece and Turkey, both of whose governments
were still actively involved in Cypriot affairs, that would result in the declaration of a new and
independent state known as the Turkish Republic of North em Cyprus.

16

In January, 1982, a new secretary general carne to power in the UN: Javier Perez de
Cuellar. De Cuellar had spent some time in Cyprus and was familiar with the problem from
firsthand experience. Prior secretary generals were convinced that the intercommunal
negotiations would yield a solution. The UN Good Offices of the Secretary General under
Cuellar maintained that conviction in 1982 when he said that, "the intercommunal talks continue
to represent the best available method for pursuing effective negotiating process." After meeting
with leaders of both communities in the spring of 1982, Cuellar noted that both were dissatisfied
with the progress of the intercommunal talks and Cuellar expressed his interest in speeding up
..
t he negotiation process.

17

16 Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: IB Tauris), 279-283; Richmond
and Ker-Lindsay ed., 138; UNSC, Resolution 367.

Edward Newman, "The Most Impossible Job in the World," in Work of the UN, 137140, here 137; UN Secretary General, Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Operation in Cyprus (For the period 1 December 1982 to 31 May 1983), (New York: UNSC
Official Records), 15; Necatigil, 158; Bolukbasi, 423.
17
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By the end of 1982, the UN Secretary General had submitted his biannual report for the
renewal of the UN mission in Cyprus and mentioned that progress was being made in the
intercommunal talks. According to the report, the leaders of both communities were making
progress on constitutional issues and would soon be working on territorial issues. There was both
optimism and urgency in the words of the Secretary General. In reference to the creation of a
"package deal" that would encompass a solution with the agreed upon terms, the Secretary
General said, "While I do not underestimate the difficulties of this enterprise, I remain confident
that, with the necessary political will, it can be accomplished." Yet, Cuellar also wrote, "Time
appears to be eroding what some have called 'the window of opportunity' to resolve the Cyprus
problem." So while the Secretary General saw progress as a very likely outcome, he also
expressed concern that if a solution would not be found soon, then there would never be a
solution.

18

Some scholars point to the June, 1982 election of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in
Greece as the beginning of conditions which would eventually incite the Turkish Cypriots to
declare independence. Relations between Greece and Turkey had been especially tense since the
1974 military intervention in Cyprus and the election ofPapandreou,

a man sometimes described

as having radical political ideologies against the West and Turkey, meant that the Greeks would
be taking a harsher approach to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. Papandreou wanted
to call for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island before a settlement was reached and

18 UN Secretary General, Report by the Secretary-General
on the United Nations
Operation in Cyprus (For the period 1 June 1982 to 30 November 1982), (New York: UNSC
Official Records).

14
he wished to do this by bringing the Cyprus issue out into the international community rather
than continue as an issue being mediated by the Security Council and Secretary General. 19

In February, 1982, Papandreou met with the Greek Cypriot leader, Kyprianou, and
worked to further the process of internationalizing the Cyprus issue. Following this meeting, the
Greek Cypriots pursued internationalization more aggressively than ever despite protests from
the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots were able to gamer significant support from members
of the UN General Assembly through this policy.20

On May 13, 1983, largely as a result of the Greek Cypriots international promotion of
their cause, the General Assembly passed a resolution with a vast majority that condemned the
Turkish military for its continued occupation of territory in Cyprus. The Resolution called on all
nations (which meant Turkey) to respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and
immediately withdrawal all foreign troops. This would not be the first time the General
Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus. As
recently as 1979, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 34/30 with wording that was almost
identical to Resolution 37/253?1

The 1983 resolution was unique for a few reasons though. First of all, it came after
nearly nine years of a Turkish presence on the island with no solution emerging. The Turkish

19Crawshaw, 73; John C. Louis, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 63, no.
2 (1984), 375-391, here 378; Dodd, History and Politics, 142-145.
20Crawshaw, 73; Louis, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy," 375-391, here 378; Necatigil,
156-165.
21Necatigil, 156-165, here 162; UN General Assembly, Resolution 37/253, (New York:
UN General Assembly Official Records, 1983); 37/253; United Nations General Assembly,
Resolution 34/30, (New York: UN General Assembly Official Records, 1979).

15

Cypriots had spent almost ten years negotiating without resolution and Denktash had already
alluded to a possible attempt at declaring independence. It also came at a time when the
intercommunal talks were beginning to stall yet again. In other words, the resolution came at a
delicate and frustrating time for the Turkish Cypriots and contributed to their decision to declare
their independence. Recently, Denktash noted that, "By 1983, my people [were] psychologically
ready for a new step forward." The Turkish Cypriots were prepared for a positive change after
almost ten years of non-solution. In his biannual report only a few weeks later, the Secretary
General noted that the Turkish Cypriots refused to meet for intercommunal talks specifically
because of the General Assembly resolution.r'

The second half of 1983 became an eventful time for the Cyprus issue. The Secretary
General put forth initiatives to once again try to advance talks between the Turkish Cypriots and
Greek Cypriots in the wake of the General Assembly's resolution. Denktash was even convinced
in July to delay any plans at declaring independence until it was clear that the intercommnal talks
would not work. By fall of 1983, however, these talks broke down with each side blaming the
other for their failure. Despite the disagreement on who was to blame among the communities,
the international community perceived the Turkish Cypriots as being at fault.23
The Turkish Cypriots decided on November 15th as an ideal date for their announcement
for a number of reasons. First and foremost of those reasons were the festering frustrations with
the peace process which had yielded little in the ten years of Turkish troops residing on the
22 UN Secretary General, Report by the Secretary-General
on the United Nations
Operation in Cyprus (For the period 1 December 1982 to 1 June 1983), (New York: UNSC
Official Records); UNGA, Resolution 371253; Necatigil, 168; Denktash to author, March 10,
2011.

23

Necatigil, 168; Dodd, History and Politics, 146-147.

16
island. Denktash and other Turkish Cypriot leaders pointed to the fact that the Republic of
Cyprus was a recognized state with all the benefits that come with that while the Turkish
Cypriots had little pull because of their lack of a recognized government. This was especially
true following the General Assembly resolution. They felt that because the Greek Cypriots were
consistently in a position of power with the Republic of Cyprus, a favorable solution for the
Turkish Cypriots would be impossible to find. By declaring statehood, the Turkish Cypriots
hoped to gain equal footing with the Greek Cypriots. They wished to reach the same status that
they had during the partnership established with the 1960 government. They claimed that this
would pave the way for a federal solution to the island's problem in which they could again
become equal partners with the Greek Cyriots.i"

Events in Turkey provided the opportunity needed by the Turkish Cypriots to make a
statement about their place in the international community. Turkey was a military and political
presence on Cyprus after its 1974 invasion. This presence made what happened in one country
affect the other. In 1980, Turkey experienced a coup at the hands of its military. The Turkish
government was extremely unstable for years leading up to the coup. Political parties were
engaged in bitter fighting which was resulting in more and more deadly violence on a regular
basis. At the same time, Turkey's economy was in a bad state, with inflation running rampant. So
in September, 1980 Turkish military leaders seized control of the government from the civilian
government. Within two years, the junta revised Turkey's constitution and planned general

Denktash, Cyprus Triangle, 107-108; "Republic is Set Up," New York Times,
November 16, 1983.
24

17

elections for 1983 that would reestablish a civilian government with the changes implemented by
the junta.f

Cyprus was both problematic and positive for Turkey. Since the intervention of 1974,
Turkey was treated as the government responsible for the Turkish Cypriot side of the island, as
they instituted the Turkish Cypriot-led government and were a party of the cease-fire that ended
the invasion. The embargoes placed on Turkey as a response to the 1974 intervention were in the
process of removal. The Cyprus issue was a thorn in Turkey's side, however, in terms oftheir
dealings with the international community. The invasion was denounced and, as mentioned, the
UN General Assembly yet again had recently voted strongly against their continued presence on
the island, meaning that despite the passage of ten years and the ending of arms embargoes from
countries like the United States, Turkey was still being condemned for the action. At the same
time, the Turkish presence on Cyprus was a symbol of pride for Turks who had come to the
rescue of their comrades on the island. The continued protection of Turkish Cypriots spoke to the
nationalist sentiments in Turkey. 26

This became a crucial point in the Turkish Cypriots' movement towards declaring
independence, as the road to transition in Turkey provided an ideal climate for the Turkish
Cypriots to make their announcement. November, 1983 marked the transition in Turkey back to
a civilian run government. There was an interim period between the military government
stepping down and the civilian government assuming power for a period of days after the
election. Perhaps Denktash put it best when he wrote, "We so timed the declaration of
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independence that the outgoing military Government would not bear any responsibility while the
incoming civilian Government would be faced with a fete-accompli. That is why we chose a
date, just in the middle of this change in Turkey." Essentially, the interim period provided an
opportunity so that both the government that was leaving and that which was entering would be
in a positive position following the declaration.f

Despite accusations that say otherwise, it is fairly clear that Turkey was not even aware
that the Turkish Cypriots planned to declare independence. Some scholars such as Clement Dodd
suggest that Turkey would never have approved such an action on the part of the Turkish
Cypriots. A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey to the UN claims that Denktash
officially informed a Turkish representative of his decision right after the declaration. According
to the letter, the independence of the Turkish Cypriot people was declared because of smart
political maneuvering on the part of Denktash and not simply as an extension of the Turkish
government's wishes. 28

The Turkish Cypriot declaration would be brought before the legislature on November

is",

1983. Rauf Denktash created an independent Republic with a document that claimed the

Turkish Cypriots' right to self-determination. It should be noted that this is the same argument
that the Cypriots used to appeal to the UN in 1954, though as will be discussed later, that

27Crawshaw, 76; Denktash, to author, March 10,2011; Souter, 666.
28Dodd, History and Politics, 147-149; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey to
President of the Security Council, November 16, 1983 (New York: UNSC Official Records,
1983); Judith Miller, "Cypriots Sought to Dramatize Lot," New York Times, November 17, 1983.
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argument would not be considered valid by the international community. The Turkish Cypriot
legislature voted unanimously for independence based on Denktash's declaration.

29

An announcement was made to an ecstatic crowd of a few thousand Turkish Cypriots in
the capital city, Nicosia, and in a radio announcement. Denktash's speech addressed a number of
key issues in the Cyprus dispute that were officially claimed as the reason for the declaration.
Denktash stated, "We can, and must, find peaceful, just and durable solutions to all our
differences through negotiations on the basis of equality." The Turkish Cypriots were convinced
that a desirable solution would only come about when the two communities sat at the negotiating
table on equal footing.

30

The Declaration itself expressed the feeling of betrayal felt by the Turkish Cypriots at
the hands of Greek Cypriots that had been stated so many times before. The document states:

The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent State was based on the
partnership of the Turkish Cypriot People and the Greek Cypriot People. This joint
Republic, which was established through the agreement of the two national communities,
has been deliberately undermined and destroyed by the Greek Cypriot Administration
since 1963.
The document goes on to detail the way in which the Greek Cypriots supposedly robbed the
Turkish Cypriots of all their power in the joint government established in 1960 and therefore,
they had no right to exercise power over the Turkish Cypriot community. The declaration quotes
the United States Declaration of Independence and the UN Charter drawing from these
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documents in an attempt to claim greater legitimacy. These claims had all been used before to
justify the Turkish invasion and the ongoing physical separation ofthe communities.i!

The declaration closes by extending an olive branch to the Greek Cypriots in saying they
hope to coexist and live peacefully. It also expresses a wish to continue negotiations, possibly
towards a federated state which the Turkish Cypriots found desirable. Furthermore, the
declaration explicitly stated willingness for ongoing cooperation with the UN's peacekeeping
and facilitation mission.f

Despite the hopeful tone that the international community would accept the declaration,
Denktash claims that the Turkish Cypriots were prepared for an adverse resolution from the UN.
In reference to the expected negative reaction from the international community, Denktash
stated, "The proclamation of the new state will not hinder, but facilitate the establishment of a
genuine federation." Denktash was trying to ease the shock of the surprise decision by
demonstrating his willingness to continue the UN peace process, which he argued would get
better results.

33
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The Immediate International Response
The Turkish Cypriots gambled in hoping for the international community to sympathize
with their cause. In the immediate aftermath of that gamble, the Turkish Cypriots lost. The
international community had been increasing pressure on Turkey because of the earlier
mentioned Greek Cypriot move to internationalize the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriots
had already stepped away from the talks in May, following General Assembly resolution and so
their declaration of independence was seen as yet another unhelpful and antagonistic move.
Essentially, there was a fundamental difference in the way that the Turkish Cypriots and the UN
perceived the declaration. On the one hand, the declaration was a sign of empowerment to the
Turkish Cypriots who had felt oppressed for years by the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, the
UN saw the declaration as a sign of abandonment of the peace process. This fundamental
difference in views would shape the way that the UN reacted to the Turkish Cypriots.l"

There was an initial concern over the possibility that violence would once again break out
between the two countries. Turkey even issued preliminary threats to deter any action against the
newly declared republic. While the intent of these deterrence measures was to protect the new
republic from reprisals, they did not help the image of the Turkish Cypriots in the eyes of the
international community. The Greek Cypriots, continuing their policy of internationalization

of

the issue, appealed to the international community, claiming its victimization at the hands of
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Turkish occupying forces. The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand were making threatening
gestures."

Simply put, the UN reacted swiftly and harshly to the declaration. A clear distinction was
made between the views of the UN's and Turkish Cypriots on independence right from the start.
The Turkish Cypriots claimed their right to self-determination which itself lies in the UN charter.
The UN viewed this idea as meant for people controlled by colonial powers and not for that of
the governments that emerged since colonial governments left. They deemed the move to be a
secessionist act that would jeopardize the negotiation process."

A number of member nations sent in letters decrying the Turkish Cypriot move. These
letters referred to the Turkish Cypriot state as the, "so called Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus" which indicated a refusal to grant legitimacy to the claim of independence. Much like
the 1964 Resolution referring to "the Republic of Cyprus" being an important choice in
language, so too would be the way that countries referred to the TRNC. The name ofthe newly
declared republic was always in quotation marks in these letters to the Secretary General to
indicate that no recognition was intended by the use of the name. Some countries refused to use
the name at all. The letters sent by the various states in support of the Republic of Cyprus also
contain harshly worded language. The representative from Vietnam stated, for example, "The
Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam resolutely supports the just struggle of the
Cypriot people against imperialist and reactionary forces." This quote shows the condemnation
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of the Turkish Cypriot action, but it also uses the term "imperialist" meaning that the Vietnamese
blamed the Turkish government, who had been called imperialist before for its 1974 occupation,
for the Declaration.37

Unsurprisingly, Turkey almost immediately recognized the newly declared country. They
defended their view point on a number of occasions, writing in a letter to the UN, "We would
undoubtedly have preferred it if a just and lasting solution could have been reached through the
intercommunal negotiations, without arriving at the present state of affairs," and goes on to say,
"Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot side cannot be held responsible for the fact that the
negotiations, which have already lasted nine years, have failed to bring about a solution." Turkey
expresses an interesting sentiment on behalf ofthe Turkish Cypriots: a solution brought on by
the UN negotiations would be great,but they have not yet yielded desirable results and so the
Turkish Cypriots had the right to change the state of affairs surrounding the talks.38

Other than Turkey, there was another country that recognized the TRNC. Bangledesh
recognized the country for a few hours after the declaration was announced before being
pressured to rescind its claim. Greece threatened to break ties with the nation which could
explain the change in policy. No other countries recognized the Turkish Cypriot state as
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members of the UN united rallied against what was seen as a major and possibly irreparable
blow to the peace procese."

Britain scrambled to prepare an international response to the declaration. Being one of the
Guarantor Powers from the 1960 treaties, and still claiming their sovereign air bases on Cyprus,
Great Britain retained a vested interest in the island. A letter from Great Britain was sent the day
of the declaration that urged the Security Council to convene in order to discuss the Turkish
Cypriot declaration. The swift reaction and request for an emergency meeting is indicative of the
urgency felt by the UN to address the Cypriot claims of independence.l''

The UN Security Council met to discuss the resolution outlined by the British within days
of the declaration. The Turkish Cypriots pleaded their claim, arguing that they had been victims
of a government that had excluded them. The Greek Cypriots claimed their sovereignty that had
been established since 1963 over the entire island and expressed their own victimization at the
hands of the Turkish occupation troops."

Most of the members of the Security Council rallied around the Greek Cypriot side. Most
countries on the Security Council described the acts of the Turkish Cypriots as being counterproductive. They described the actions by, "the so called 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,"
as deplorable. On November

39

is", 1983, the UN Security

Council voted and approved Resolution
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541. The vote was near unanimous with 13 votes for, one abstention and one against. The
resolution condemned the declaration of independence and asked for its withdrawal.
Furthermore, it requested that UN states do not recognize the newly declared state. Essentially,
the resolution attempted to return the state of affairs to what they were prior to the declaration
since those conditions were seen as being the best way for the problem to be addressed.Y

The vote against was from Pakistan. The reason for their "no" vote was because of
wording in the resolution that the Pakistani delegation thought undesirable. In the words of the
Pakistani representative, "In the revised draft resolution this paragraph has been modified to
exclude any reference to the intercommunal negotiations, which touch the very core of the
Cyprus question." Rather than focusing on only condemning the Turkish Cypriots, the Pakistani
representative found the lack of mention of intercommunal talks in the draft resolution
problematic enough to break from the norm and vote against Resolution 541. Indeed, this lack of
mention of the two communities' talks is a major departure from UN Security Council
resolutions prior to the declaration.43

The abstention came from Jordan. The Jordanian representative claimed its support for
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Yet, the ambassador also
expressed concern with the approach that the UN had been taking with Cyprus claiming that the
UN was not properly addressing the internal issues in Cyprus and that this ultimately led to the
"unfortunate" move by the Turkish Cypriots. More specifically, the Jordanian delegate said, "It
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will be difficult for any effort to achieve a peaceful solution to this problem to succeed if it does
not take that into account and ifit does not give [the internal] aspect enough attention." The
abstention was taken because Jordan did not feel it should continue to support what they
considered to be a flawed approach to Cyprus."

It is interesting that the most sympathetic of the UN Security Council members towards
the Turkish Cypriots are Muslim countries that until the end of World War II were also
colonized. Bangladesh's recognition, although later decided to be premature, was the only
recognition received by the TRNC outside of Turkey. Those countries which were unhappy with
the severity of the UN Security Council resolutions were also Muslim and former colonies. Any
language to indicate direct support for the Turkish Cypriots cannot be found in their explanations
of their votes, but Pakistan and Jordan's dissent is as far as any country outside of Turkey went
from the agreed upon dismissal of the new country."

Despite those few exceptions, the push to deny the Turkish Cypriots recognition of their
new country was surprisingly universal. In a time when the United States and the Soviet Union
had disagreements on a number of key international issues, the Cyprus conflict seemed to bring
common goals to the two Cold War super powers. The United States put pressure on a lot of
other countries to back the UN Security Council Resolution, not to mention the fact that it was
instrumental in pressuring Bangladesh to rescind its recognition. Denktash thinks that the reason
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for this lay in the United States' powerful Greek lobby, which he believes drove the United
States to exert its influence in its wide range of power to condemn the Turkish Cypriot action.46

Despite the major rejection ofthe Turkish Cypriot move by the international community
and the UN, both the Turkish and Turkish Cypriots remained steadfast intheir decision. The
resolution did little to change their minds and was publicly denounced by the Turkish side of the
issue. At the conclusion of the meeting about Resolution 541, the Turkish ambassador closed by
stating, "If the Greek Cypriot representative expects Turkey or the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus to give up independence, or expects Turkey to withdraw its recognition, he must really
be ignorant ofthe Turkish dictionary: certain words cannot be found there." This is a surprisingly
sharply worded response which closed the meeting on Resolution 541 and similarly is reflective
of the mood of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriots.Y

At the same time, the Greek Cypriots were happy with the decision which had essentially
backed their side. Among the final words of the Greek Cypriot ambassador were, "My only task
at this late hour is to the Council for its adoption of today' s resolution, which fully vindicates the
position of my Government, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus." The UN's position was
always to maintain the status quo until a solution could be found. Inadvertently, that position
generally favored one side or the other. 48

Any further action that the Turkish Cypriots took that consolidated their attempted
independence was met with quick and stem resistance. The UN's response to the Turkish
46
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Cypriot's declaration of independence was only the beginning as the TRNC consolidated its
position and the UN attempted to mitigate any effects that the Turkish Cypriot actions might
create. The UN was quick and vigilant, meeting any action that challenged the goals of the
organization with swift responses that recalled the organization's previous resolutions against
any action it perceived to be detrimental to the reunification of the island.

In April, 1984 Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot state exchanged ambassadors as a final act
of recognition on the part of the Turkish. The opening of formal relations with a country is a
major diplomatic step. This meant the establishment of a Turkish embassy in,the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus and vice versa. As with the rhetoric surrounding the Turkish
Cypriot declaration of independence, the Security Council regarded actions which advanced the
Turkish Cypriot claim to sovereignty as being detrimental to the peace process between the two
communities. Turkey's initial recognition was a step towards its recognition, but the act of
exchanging ambassadors solidified their diplomatic relations with the country the UN refused to
acknowledge.Y

The UN was quick to condemn this action much like the declaration of independence. On
May 11t\ 1984, the UN passed Resolution 550 which denounced the exchange of ambassadors.
The resolution went on to reiterate a number of points including the demand for the withdrawal
of all foreign troops and a call to the international community to continue to decline any sort of
recognition to the new country. More specifically regarding the exchange of ambassadors, the
UN Resolution 550 read, "[The UN Security Council is] Gravely concerned about further
secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus which are in violation of
Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the Secretary-General, April 19, 1984 (New
York: UNSC Official Records, 1984).
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resolution 541 (1983)." The act of ambassador exchange is referred to in the same way as the
declaration: as a secessionist act. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot North is referred to as "the
occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus" which effectively recognizes the Greek Cypriot
government as the legitimate authority on the island and the occupation by Turkey, but not the
presence of a Turkish Cypriot government. The language is both careful and harsh. It sidesteps
granting any unintentional legitimacy to the Turkish Cypriots while strongly denouncing their
.

actions.

50

Resolution 550 also foreshadowed events to come when it was stated that the Security
Council was also concerned by "the contemplated holding of a 'constitutional referendum' and
'elections'."

The Turkish Cypriots were attempting to further solidify their claim to statehood by

formally establishing a new government and discussed this point since the declaration of
independence.

51

Negotiations between the two communities resumed rather quickly after the declaration
of independence despite the exchange of ambassadors and UN resolution condemning the action.
In September, 1984 De Cuellar met with leaders of both communities in New York to continue
the negotiation process. The Secretary General wrote about the meetings with a lot of optimism
for both sides to conduct negotiations. De Cuellar even comments in his biannual report that
major strides were made in territorial issues that were at the center of the Cyprus dispute. Despite
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concerns that the declaration of independence would hinder the negotiation process, the
prospects for improvement were very real. 52

The Turkish Cypriots continued alluding to the creation of a constitution for their state.
Yet the constitution took another entire year to materialize for the Turkish Cypriots. A document
was finally put forth in March, 1985 and was adopted by the Turkish Cypriot General Assembly.
Surprisingly, the Secretary General does not mention this development in his biannual report that
was published three weeks following the adoption of the constitution. The constitution called for
a secular state with three branches of government consisting of a unicameral legislature, a
president with a council of ministers and a court system. The document differed very little from
the system that was set up for the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. Yet, the adoption was
significant in that the Turkish Cypriots went forward with their claims of statehood to the point
where it formally established its governing body. After its adoption by the legislature, the
document was up for referendum on May 5 where it was passed by a large majority. A month
later, RaufDenktash

was elected president by a similarly large majority.r'

There is some speculation among scholars regarding the amount of time it took for the
Turkish Cypriots to adopt their constitution. Indeed, more than a year and a half passed since
their declaration of independence before a formal government was established in the TRNC.
Clement Dodd presented the possibility that the Turkish Cypriots left themselves a way to back
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down from the declaration if necessary. If the Turkish Cypriots decided that the declaration was
a mistake, they could walk away from it without permanent institutions in place. Considering the
shrewd political maneuvering surrounding the announcement of the declaration, it would not be a
stretch to believe that the Turkish Cypriots were acting prudently with their constitution.

54

While the adoption of a constitution formally established a Turkish Cypriot government
that was recognized only by Turkey, the UN Security Council took little notice this time. No
resolution was adopted condemning the constitution nor was any mention of the act made in the
biannual resolutions that renewed the mandate for UN forces in Cyprus. By the time the
constitution was formally adopted, the international community made it clear that no recognition
was given to the new country and it is evident that the Security Council saw little reason to
condemn an action that would not create many more issues. A resolution was passed in June to
renew the mandate for the UN forces in Cyprus that did not explicitly mention the constitution.f

Quasi-independence

to the Annan Plan: 1985- 2004

Following the adoption of the Turkish Cypriot constitution, things quieted down in the
UN regarding Cyprus. As mentioned, the UN Security Council's response to the declaration was
a series of harshly worded resolutions that condemned the declaration of independence and
similar actions, and called upon the international community to reject the Turkish Cypriot's
attempt at sovereignty. After their 1983 resolution, the UN General Assembly never again passed
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a resolution regarding Cyprus. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remained steadfast in
its claims of independence

In a recent e-mail correspondence with the author, Denktash provided his view on what
impact the UN response to the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence had on the events
that would follow. He wrote, "[The] Security Council's condemnation of the TRNC and their
continuing support of the negotiations without a proper diagnosis has been the main cause of
non-settlement." Denktash indicated that the reason the two communities of Cyprus have not
reunified is because he feels they have not seen the situation for what it is and reacted properly.
Such a view indicated no regret from declaring independence in 1983. The leader still felt that
declaring independence was the best way to a solution to the Cyprus problem.

56

Whether or not Denktash was right about the UN's response hindering a settlement in
Cyprus, the international community maintained its policy of not recognizing the attempted state
which was a policy called on by the UN. Turkey remained the only country willing to have
diplomatic relations with the self-proclaimed republic. The UN continued its process of
intercommunal negotiations while carefully avoiding language relating to statehood. The Greek
and Turkish Cypriots were referred to as communities and Turkish Cypriot representatives were
never representing a "government". If the UN used the temi "government", the organization
would potentially grant the Turkish Cypriots greater legitimacy and thus the term was avoided.
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This was very political and precise language that carried over from even before the declaration
but should be noted because of the Turkish Cypriots' perception of their statehood.Y

The Turkish Cypriots continued to claim their sovereignty for the next twenty years but
in a number of ways lacked true independence from Turkey. The embargoes which were in place
since the Turkish intervention in 1974 remained in effect on the Northern half of the island. This
policy, which was a result of the UN resolutions that called for the international community to
withhold recognition, left the Turkish Cypriots to continue to depend on Turkey in order to
survive. The only trade the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus could take part in was with
Turkey.

58

The lack of trading partners other than Turkey meant that the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus' economy was not self-sustaining. In order to function, the economy was
completely reliant on aid from Turkey. Large amounts of economic and financial aid was needed
from Turkey to keep the new country afloat. The airport in the TRNC's capital of Nicosia, along
with all ports, was considered illegal by the Republic of Cyprus which retai,ned recognized
authority over the entire island. The Turkish representative to the UN actually cited the
embargoes in 2000 as a humanitarian issue demonstrating the dire circumstances of the economy
ofthe TRNC.59
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The Turkish military remained present on the island after the declaration as it still does
today. In 1983, it was estimated by the UN that about 30,000 Turkish troops were stationed on
the island of Cyprus. Subsequent reports by secretary generals indicated an increase in arms and
troop amounts in the 1990' s. The Greek Cypriots had similar increases in troop amounts during
this time. It is well known that the TRNC's security is dependent on Turkey much like its
economy.I"

The Turkish Cypriots' continued need of Turkey even after they declared their own
independence is indicative of the effectiveness of the UN reaction. With resolutions calling on
countries to disregard the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence, the Security Council and
its member nations were very quick in dismantling any hope for international recognition of the
TRNC. The lack of international support for the effort towards self-determination left the
Turkish Cypriot state relatively isolated from the rest of the world which was exactly the state of
affairs prior to the declaration of independence. Little changed outside of the lack of direct
Turkish control but since the Turkish Cypriots could not survive without Turkish aid, they
retained a certain amount of indirect control. While the Turkish Cypriots never renounced their
claims to independence, the UN Security Council resolutions created a situation which made
such an action unnecessary.
The Turkish Cypriots' claim to independence did create some problems in the negotiation
process beyond the initial negative reactions of the UN and Greek Cypriots. In negotiations, the
Turkish Cypriots sometimes demanded that they be recognized as a state in a sort of loose
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confederation with the Greek Cypriot government. The Turkish Cypriots more or less considered
themselves to be an independent state with or without international recognition and wished to
keep as much of that independence as possible at reunification. This prompted language in
Security Council resolutions that urged all parties to expeditiously find a solution."

In the biannual Secretary General reports on Cyprus, the Secretary General comments
repeatedly on an issue that arose because of the Turkish Cypriots' claimed sovereignty and the
UN's refusal of recognition. This included UN attempts to speak with Turkish military and
political leaders regarding the presence of thousands of Turkish troops on the island. The official
stance ofthe Turkish military and government was always to redirect the UN to the appropriate
party which in their view was the Turkish Cypriot government. To the Turkish, the government
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was legitimate and therefore the only party able to
address the military presence in the territory they controlled. The UN, on the other hand, did not
wish to recognize the Turkish Cypriot's authority over armed forces stationed there and saw the
government of Turkey as being responsible for their occupying troops. This exchange was
mentioned so many times in years of biannual reports that it seems almost ridiculous. As with
every aspect of the Cyprus issue, the possibility of unintentional recognition of the TRNC
prevented certain seemingly simple things from happening.f
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Throughout the 1990's and late 1980's, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots made more
progress toward resolutions that would ultimately fail. This period is similar of negotiations
following 1974. Some progress was made but nothing the talks always broke down and the cycle
started anew. Security Council resolutions at the time promoted a quick solution while
expressing concern at the lack of meaningful progress. One resolution made by the Security
Council specifically blamed the Turkish Cypriot position as being the reason for the failure of
negotiations. Resolution 789 claimed that the Turkish Cypriots did not adhere to fundamental
principles that were established for reaching a solution in Cyprus.f

The UN Security Council Resolutions regarding Cyprus referred indirectly to the
problems associated with the claims that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was a state.
New language emerged in the resolutions making it clear what the UN saw as the only
acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem which was a bicommunal federal state. The
resolutions of this time referred to the Turkish Cypriot position as being problematic and not in
line with already agreed upon terms. As mentioned, the Turkish Cypriots wished for a level of
autonomy in a unified state that was not in line with the goals of the UN or the Greek Cypriots.
There were a number of resolutions during this time that expressed concern over the lack of a
solution but did little else."

63

"Security Council Resolution 789," Resolutions on Cyprus: 1960-2006.

64 "Security Council Resolution 750," "Security Council Resolution 774," "Security
Council Resolution 789," "Security Council Resolution 831," Resolutions on Cyprus: 19602006.

37

The Annan Plan
The Republic of Cyprus applied for membership in the European Union (EU) during the
1990's and as early as 1996, the UN secretary general recognized the possibilities that
negotiations for ascension could provide for a settlement. Membership in the EU would provide
a number of benefits to the Republic of Cyprus especially economically. Their application was
seriously being considered at the turn of the century to the anger of the Turkish Cypriots. Their
anger arose from the fact that the Republic of Cyprus was under serious consideration while
Turkey was not. 65

The Secretary General of the time, Kofi Annan, developed a comprehensive plan that
would reunite the two communities as a single state that would then be accepted into the EU. The
so called "Annan plan" was long and complex which is indicative of the numerous issues that
plagued the island for half a century. The prospect of reuniting the island and ascending to the
EU was a carrot that Annan and many others felt would compel the two communities to accept
the terms of the agreement. Neither side would get everything they wanted, but they would
receive a major boost from the EU that was meant to make reunification more appealing than
holding out on the issues of land and property.

66

The Annan plan was voted on by referendum on April 24, 2004. This was a major change
in the UN's approach to negotiations which until this point had the leaders of both sides meeting
rather than leaving the fate of the island to the public. The political dealings of presidents and
ambassadors would be replaced by a democratic vote that allowed the people to determine their
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future. Furthermore, the UN's involvement in created and negotiating a plan to reunite Cyprus
was a more direct role than it had taken in past. The increased involvement of the UN was a sign
of the opportunity that the world saw in the Annan plan.67

Despite the fact that political leaders in the North were divided on whether or not to
support the plan, the Turkish Cypriots voted for the Annan plan in a solid majority. Considering
the often resistant position the Turkish Cypriot representatives took in negotiations with the
Greeks, this was a surprising and telling sign of what the average Turkish Cypriot felt about the
ongoing division of the island. The Turkish Cypriots were willing to relinquish their claimed
independence which had existed for over 20 years at this point. Not only was the EU a clear
benefit to both communities, but the Annan plan provided a way out ofthe decade's long
isolation ofthe Turkish Cypriots that made them so dependent on Turkey. Denktash, who was
opposed to the plan, actually was voted out of office because of his stance on the EU in 2005
after 20 years of presidency in the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriot people were ready for a change.t"

To the disappointment of the international community, the Greek Cypriots did not vote in
favor of the Annan plan meaning that reunification was again delayed. Of the Greek Cypriot
voters, 76 percent voted against the plan: an overwhelming majority. Without reunification, and
thus without the Turkish Cypriots, the Republic of Cyprus entered the European Union in 2004
and policy makers began working towards a new solution.69

67

Hannay, 208-236;

68

Dodd, History and Politics, 252;

69

Dodd, History and Politics, 253; Hannay, 208-236.

39

Conclusion
The Annan plan was the closest the island of Cyprus came to. reunification in its nearly 40
years of division, Its failure was a disappointment fo.rmo.st of those who. were involved but the
UN continues its missio.n of peacekeeping and facilitation. Despite co.ncerns that the Turkish
Cypriot declaration of independence would spell the end of productive negotiations,
intercommunal talks are ongoing. The UN maintained the status quo. that was perceived by
policy-makers as being jeopardized in 1983.
Ethnic conflict is something that the UN will continue to. be a part of in the future and its
role in those conflicts remains somewhat uncertain. The UN's presence on Cyprus is the longest
running continuous mission that the international organization has ever undertaken. As other
ethnic conflicts spring up, the UN will have to. be ready to. address them based on their
experience in Cyprus. Violence and secessionism will unfortunately always be a biproduct of
ethnic divisions. The declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 and the subsequent
recognition by a number of states, including the United States, shares some similarities with the
Turkish Cypriot's situation and may signal a departure from old conventions regarding such
situatio.ns.7o

Unlike the years following the declaration, progress has been made towards this goal of
international recognition since the Annan Plan. If the Turkish Cypriots continue their
cooperation, there is a chance that the UN will someday change its views on the right of the
Turkish Cypriots to. declare statehood. If not the UN, than perhaps other countries will. The

John R. Crook, "United States Supports Kosovn's Declaration of Independence in
ICJ," The American Journal of International Law 104, no. 1 (Jan 2010): 101-105.
70
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Organization of Islamic States afforded the TRNC the designation or "Turkish Cypriot State" in
2004 which gives the community greater recognition than ever.71
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Michael Barnes
Honors Capstone Proposal

1. The Political Factors Contributing to the Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence in
1983

2.

I intend to examine the political factors contributing to the decision of RaufDenktash

(the

Turkish Cypriot leader) to declare independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
and the consequences of that action on the relationship between the TRNC and Turkey in the
international arena. A significant number of scholars argue that Denktash was a pawn of the
Turkish government in Ankara which had direct control of North Cyprus prior to 1983. Yet
others see a Denktash's actions as taking advantage of the political instability then occurring
in Turkey. By examining the political situations in each country, the comments writings of
Denktash, and the international fallout that followed, more light may be shed on the complex
relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This topic is
significant in its defining impact on the state of affairs relating to the Cyprus problem. On a
larger scale, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has become part of a recent
phenomenon of self-proclaimed states that are not recognized as states because of this event.
Understanding the relationship between the TRNC and Turkey is helpful to understanding
this interesting dilemma.
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4. I will examine the events surrounding the TRNC declaration of independence. This will
involve looking at the Cyprus problem in the years immediately prior to the declaration and
the situation in Turkey since its military coup in 1980. The events that transpired in late 1983
will be discussed. Finally, the ramifications of the declaration on the relationship between
Turkey and Cyprus will also be examined.

I will be using Rauf Denktash at the United Nations to see any changes in rhetoric
concerning the Cyprus problem and Turkey before and after the declaration. Denktash's The
Cyprus Triangle and In Search of Justice will be used to understand the political situation
before and after the declaration respectively. UN documents will be used heavily because the
Cyprus problem has been dealt with by that organization since 1963. Finally, newspaper
articles will be used to gather quotes about the relationship between Turkey and the TRNC
from before and after the declaration.

5. Professor Fogleman has provided a rigid structure to the completion of my thesis. Below are
the upcoming steps/ due dates through the end of the semester:
February 16- Typed copy of one page of notes from a primary source
Annotated bibliography of primary sources
February 23- Historiography of secondary sources on the topic
March 2- Essay detailing findings in primary sources compared to what is said in
secondary resources
March 9- Annotated outline and annotated bibliography of all sources
March 23- Complete but shortened final paper
April 6- Introduction

May 11 th - Final Draft
6. This past summer, I studied abroad in Turkey and Cyprus with Dr. J. D. Bowers and
witnessed the Cyprus problem first-hand. I met with officials and dignitaries including the
RaufDenktash

I intend to write about.
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